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INTRODUCTION
Human beings live in a social context,
where interacting with others is crucial for
survival, and having a clear representa-
tion of both the “self” and the “other” is
needed (Baumeister, 2011). Interestingly,
neuroscience has traditionally adopted a
Cartesian perspective by which the self is
a solipsistic and self-sufficient unit, funda-
mentally unrelated to the other individu-
als’ representation. Since the last decade,
however, neuroscience is increasingly pro-
moting research about how the “self” and
the “other” are processed and represented
at both intra- (Decety and Sommerville,
2003; Denny et al., 2012; Wagner et al.,
2012; Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin, 2013)
and inter-brain level (Dumas et al.,
2010, 2012). Nevertheless, the specific way
whereby neural self-other representations
co-occur and exert influence on each
other in order to promote higher-order
functions necessary for social functioning
remains largely unclear. We propose that
the philosophical theory of intersubjec-
tivity (Hegel, 1807/1977) could integrate
neuroscience findings and, in turn, shed
new light on the self-other dynamics at
neurocognitive level.
HEGEL AND SELF-OTHER DYNAMICS
Philosophy has intensively studied the
interaction between the self and other,
terming sometimes their interplay as inter-
subjectivity. In 1807, the German philoso-
pher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,
published the Phenomenology of Spirit
(Hegel, 1807/1977), where he thoroughly
investigated the progressive steps that from
a relatively simple form of thinking, such
as consciousness, lead to higher-order func-
tions, such as self-consciousness.
According to Hegel, consciousness is the
mental function that accounts for ordered
experience and which provides us with a
unified experience of reality, instead of a
chaotic flow of meaningless information.
By means of consciousness, we are there-
fore able to represent and process in a
meaningful way the stimuli that fall in
our phenomenal space. Recent theoretical
efforts have associated this crucial men-
tal function with specific brain dynam-
ics: rest-stimulus interaction at the level
of cortical and subcortical midline regions
(Northoff, 2012).
Compared with earlier philosophers,
Hegel took the notion of consciousness
one step further. In line with his ideal-
istic assumptions, he proposes that the
mind actively “constructs” the objects of
our knowledge, with no need for the
latter to rely on cognitively inaccessible
external entities. Earlier thinkers, such
as Immanuel Kant, had indeed argued
that these founding external entities were
not comprehensible to our mind (i.e.,
thing-in-itself or noumenon) (Kain, 2005).
Although his theory probably qualifies
Hegel as one of the first radical con-
structivists, it also raises a fundamen-
tal question. If neither based on external
reality nor on itself, on what is our self-
consciousness based? Hegel (1807/1977)
clearly answers that “Self-consciousness
exists in and for itself when, and by the fact
that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists
only in being acknowledged” (paragraph
178) (Hegel, 1807/1977). Three elements
are noteworthy here. First, Hegel proposes
a condition of necessity in the self-other
dyad, with each pole needing to be recog-
nized by the other one (i.e.,mutual recogni-
tion or intersubjectivity). Second, both the
self and the other maintain their specific
identity without merging into an undiffer-
entiated matrix (Coelho and Figueiredo,
2003), in that the other is recognized as a
separate subjectivity with whom a shared
subjective state is possible (i.e., recognition
of the other). Third, the self, at least in part,
exists insofar as being constructed by the
other that recognizes it back (i.e., recogni-
tion of the self ). Without the other, the self
lacks a fundamental reference to contrast
itself with, and, in turn, it is bound not to
emerge in the biological and psychological
context (Baumeister, 2011). Importantly,
a simple object fundamentally lacks self-
consciousness and as such it is not eligible
to recognize one’s self as this would lead
the latter to become “a motionless tautol-
ogy of I am I” (paragraph 167) (Hegel,
1807/1977). In other words, if the other’s
recognition is lacking, I can experience
events and objects (i.e., consciousness),
but I cannot experience myself as a self-
conscious agent (i.e., self-consciousness).
From the intersubjective perspective,
the “other” is necessary. Not only must the
other be physically present with its own
body (Mead, 1934/2009; Russon, 1997),
but the other must also recognize the sub-
ject as an intentional and self-conscious
self (Kain, 2005). In order to process such
fundamental but complex input, the brain
is expected to be properly equipped to
detect recognition by others.
INTERSUBJECTIVITY, DEFAULT MODE
NETWORK, AND MIRROR NEURON
SYSTEM
How may Hegelian intersubjectivity
inform our knowledge of the brain and,
in turn, account for our social function-
ing? Intersubjectivity could shed light on
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recent neuroimaging findings by integrat-
ing two of the most active research lines in
neuroscience, the Mirror Neurons System
(MNS) and the Default Mode Network
(DMN).
In the social context, the perception
of a meaningful and goal-directed action
leads to specific neural activation, regard-
less whether the action is performed by
the subject itself or it is observed being
performed by another actor (Iacoboni
et al., 1999). The MNS has indeed been
consistently associated with this function
whereby the other’s instrumental behavior
is neuronally represented in the observer
by means of a motor resonance mecha-
nism. In other words, a significant gesture
is encoded also in the observer’s brain
within its own motor schemata and this
helps qualify the person of the observer
as a (potentially) active and goal-directed
actor. On the contrary, immobile objects
or aimless actions do not elicit a simi-
lar response in the MNS (Preston and de
Waal, 2002). Interestingly, already in the
1930’s George Herbert Mead, a sociolo-
gist deeply influenced by Hegel’s theory,
stressed the importance of this “conver-
sation of gestures” between individuals as
the first step leading to higher levels
of self-consciousness (Mead, 1934/2009;
Markova, 1990). The MNS can therefore
be considered as a neural tool that bridges
the gap between the self and the other at
the level of lower-order physical represen-
tation (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010).
The DMN, a neural network highly
active during rest, has been associated
with psychological representing of others,
that is mentalizing (Van Overwalle and
Baetens, 2009; Schilbach et al., 2012). This
cognitive ability to adopt someone else’s
perspective and internally represent men-
tal states of others (i.e., beliefs, intentions,
and goals) implies that we subsume the
cognitive representation of other’s men-
tal activity into ours to some extent.
Interestingly, while the MNS relies on the
perception of other’s embodied actions,
mentalizing requires the ability to extract
and understand goals and intentions of
others. The latter implies that the other
is recognized as an agent. Therefore, the
DMN seems to subserve the mechanism
through which the other psychologically
resonates into one’s mind as an intentional
being (Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin, 2013).
As intersubjectivity is emerging as
a promising perspective in neuroscience
(Allen and Williams, 2011), we contend
that it can meaningfully integrate these
findings. Our Hegelian model suggests
that it is the long-term interaction between
the pre-reflective “I” (i.e., consciousness)
and the other’s representation, both at
physical (Mead, 1934/2009; Russon, 1997)
and psychological (Kain, 2005) level, that
gives rise to a self-reflective “I” (i.e., self-
consciousness). Hence, a self-conscious
individual is capable not only of process-
ing internal/external stimuli, but also of
actively reflecting upon herself, which cre-
ates a network of information related to
the self, such as attributes, beliefs, and
traits (Baumeister, 2011).
In neurocognitive terms, we could say
that self-awareness is the product of inter-
actions between both lower- and higher-
order functions, such as motor resonance
and mentalizing subserved by the MNS
and DMN, respectively. Crucially, this
neural cooperation has been recently con-
firmed by a meta-analysis showing that
self-specific activity emerges as interaction
between the DMN (i.e., perigenual ante-
rior cingulate cortex [pACC] and posterior
cingulate cortex [PCC]), and MNS (i.e.,
left anterior insula [lAI] and right inferior
frontal gyrus [rIFG]) (Qin and Northoff,
2011). Moreover, mentalizing about the
self and other is associated with simi-
lar neurocircuitry, yet, the brain seems
to be capable of distinguishing between
them without equating one to the other
(Lombardo et al., 2010).
In sum, Hegel’s model of mutual
recognition converges with neuroscience
findings in that in order to understand
ourselves we must rely on the same mech-
anisms that we use for understanding
others. Self and other representations are
strictly bond without one dissolving into
the other (Coelho and Figueiredo, 2003;
Lombardo et al., 2010). Notwithstanding
this, the representation of others’ minds
and actions shapes our own mind, as both
motor resonance mechanism (i.e., MNS)
and mentalizing (i.e., DMN) are neces-
sary to support and maintain the self-
reflective self (Lombardo et al., 2010; Qin
and Northoff, 2011; Sandrone, 2013). It is
noteworthy that a similar hypothesis has
been recently proposed by Timmermans
et al. (2012). The authors propose that
a set of neurobiological prediction-based
mechanisms support our constant attempt
to model other’s mind and the related
social interaction. Importantly, the very
same mechanism is proposed to be crucial
for developing self-consciousness too.
THE MASTER-SLAVE DYNAMIC IN THE
BRAIN
Representation of the self and other is
associated to a large extent with the same
neural circuitry (Lombardo et al., 2010),
and mutual recognition of self and other is
required (Hegel, 1807/1977; Kain, 2005).
However, this double bind implies a frag-
ile equilibrium between the two compo-
nents of the dyad. What if, for instance,
the self fails to recognize the other?
What if mutual recognition is deficient
(Williams, 1997)?
Hegel (1807/1977) addresses this
point by introducing the famous liter-
ary example of the master-slave dynamic,
as follows. Given a couple of peers, one
of the two could desire to undermine
equilibrium by overpowering the other.
Hence, one would become the “mas-
ter” while the other becomes the“slave”.
However, the situation is bound to
turn out paradoxical. By not consider-
ing the other a full self-consciousness
(i.e., objectification), the master pre-
vents the slave from recognizing it back.
Consequently, the master hinders the pro-
cess of mutual recognition upon which
it itself relies in order to emerge as a
self-conscious individual. In cognitive
terms, we could say that the individual
enhances the threshold to receive the rec-
ognizing input that could structure it as
self-conscious.
From this, several hypotheses derive.
First, objectifying the other (i.e., negating
its status of human being) leads, to a cer-
tain extent, also to a self-objectification, as
the source of recognition is now lacking.
Second, objectifying the other is expected
to impact on the DMN and/or the MSN,
the neurobiological systems maintaining
self-consciousness. Preliminary findings
support these hypotheses. First, being sub-
jected to ostracisim (i.e., seeing the sta-
tus of human being negated) leads the
victims to judge both themselves and
the ostracizer(s) less human (Bastian and
Haslam, 2010). Second, actively engaging
in ostracism makes the ostracizer feel
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less related to human beings (Legate
et al., 2013). Third, a recent study
showed that inducing participants to con-
sider other human beings as objects
leads to decreased activity of the DMN
(Jack et al., 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity seems
capable of shedding new light on the com-
plex interaction between the self and the
other at both neural and cognitive level.
The interplay between the DMN and
the MNS in supporting self-awareness
may indeed be interpreted fruitfully by
reintroducing the concept of mutual
recognition.
Importantly, new hypotheses can
be derived from the classic work of
Hegel in order to better account for the
interaction between DMN and MNS
in both healthy and clinical samples.
For instance, major psychopathologies
characterized by abnormal self-other
dynamic, such as schizophrenia, autism,
and depression (Northoff, 2007; Crespi
and Badcock, 2008; Mehta et al., 2012;
Billeke et al., 2013; Gallese et al., 2013),
represent key areas to test the explana-
tory power of the intersubjective theory.
Finally, our neurophilosophical frame-
work could be fruitfully integrated in
a new branch of social neuroscience,
namely the two-person neuroscience
(Schilbach et al., 2013). By focusing
on the neurocognitive basis of the
interaction between two individuals,
two-person neuroscience is develop-
ing new experimental paradigms and
innovative methods to analyze real-time
two-brain interplay, such as simul-
taneous neuroimaging recording or,
so-called, hyperscanning (Dumas, 2011;
Babiloni and Astolfi, in press). In
sum, we argue that the integration
of our Hegelian neurophilosophical
approach and two-person neuroscience
holds promise to convey innovative
future perspectives in the field of social
neuroscience.
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